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In the range of international responses to Don-ald Trump’s victory in the November 2016 US presidential election, German Chancellor An-
gela Merkel’s stood out. She stated: “Germany and 
America are connected by values of democracy, 
freedom, and respect for the law and the dignity 
of man, independent of origin, skin color, religion, 
gender, sexual orientation, or political views. . . . I 
offer the next President of the United States close 
cooperation on the basis of these values.”
To some observers, Merkel was signaling that 
the European Union, with German leadership, 
could lead a liberal pushback in an increasingly il-
liberal world. Such expectations are not without a 
solid foundation. After all, the EU is a cornerstone 
of the liberal world order, which is based on the 
spread of liberal democracy and organized by US-
led international institutions. The EU is a staunch 
supporter of multilateralism and particularly the 
United Nations, of human rights and liberal de-
mocracy, of peace through institutionalized coop-
eration, and of free trade.
It also has a lot at stake, for Europe has done 
well with the liberal world order. European coun-
tries have benefited from being overrepresented in 
key international institutions such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and on 
the UN Security Council. The EU came into being 
(initially as the three European Communities in 
the 1950s) and developed in the relatively benign 
environment of transatlantic cooperation. While 
the United States has been at times a highly critical 
observer, not above trying to stymie developments 
it considered to be contrary to its interests, it has 
generally viewed the European integration process 
as both a necessary and a desirable foundation 
stone of an American-led liberal world order. With 
broad US acquiescence or support, the EU over time 
developed institutions and capabilities in the area 
of foreign and security policy. Although the United 
States and the EU have repeatedly clashed on is-
sues ranging from the Bosnian war in the 1990s 
to the International Criminal Court in the early 
2000s, they have also worked together to protect 
shared interests and values. 
With Trump as president, however, US support 
for these shared values and interests is no longer 
certain. Indeed, his administration may even un-
dermine them. Trump has expressed his opposi-
tion to the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, and skepticism 
about institutions such as the United Nations.
The million-euro question is whether or 
not the EU is able and willing to function as a 
power in today’s changing global political en-
vironment. Authoritarian and populist move-
ments and governments are challenging liberal 
democracy, and the diffusion of power around 
the world to rising powers such as China has 
strengthened opposition to key international 
institutions and norms. In a world of rising na-
tionalism, the post-sovereign, post-nationalist 
EU is extremely vulnerable.
Over the past few years, the EU has faced nu-
merous crises, from the financial upheaval in the 
Eurozone to the confrontation with Russia over 
Ukraine and the surge of refugees into Europe. 
European integration has been likened to riding 
a bicycle (keep pedaling or crash), and the United 
Kingdom’s looming departure has blown a hole 
through the bicycle’s front tire. In the past, the 
United States was often there to encourage the cy-
clist onward and even help with repairs, but the 
Trump presidency augurs a much less supportive 
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role for Washington. On top of that, the European 
order is being actively challenged by Russia, which 
is also building strong links to allies within the EU 
and the United States. Under these circumstances, 
it is not unusual to read predictions of the EU’s im-
pending demise.
CREDIBILITY GAPS
As a leading international actor in the era of 
Trump, Brexit, populism, resurgent authoritari-
anism, and the diffusion of power, the EU faces 
two major credibility problems that could inhibit 
its leadership. The first is a growing “capabilities-
expectations gap,” as the British international 
relations scholar Christopher Hill termed it over 
two decades ago: expectations that the EU can de-
fend or even save the liberal world order are out-
running its capabilities to do so. The second is a 
rhetoric-practice gap: the EU’s struggles to live up 
to its liberal rhetoric in the past leave it exposed 
to the accusation that it lacks the credibility to 
lead now. But EU leadership, or at least decisive 
collection action, is still possible on some issues 
despite these gaps.
The exercise of EU power depends, obviously, 
on unity among member states. Unity will not be 
any easier to attain without the UK, even though 
it has been at times quite an awkward club mem-
ber. Crucial elections this year in the key member 
states of France, Germany, and the Netherlands 
may make collective action more difficult as gov-
ernments turn their focus to domestic concerns. 
Moreover, Brexit negotiations will drain attention 
and resources for the foreseeable future.
EU member states and institutions have always 
struggled to agree on clear priorities for external 
policies, despite a proliferation of strategies. Each 
member state has its own agenda, and agreeing 
on a set of EU priorities could require trade-offs 
that may simply be too difficult to negotiate. The 
2016 EU Global Strategy is a laudable attempt to 
be more precise about the bloc’s goals and means, 
but it contains a long list of “priorities” without 
actually prioritizing any of them or assessing 
critically how the EU could reach these myriad 
objectives given unfavorable external and inter-
nal circumstances. 
Those foreign-policy priorities are not so 
much a result of strategic planning as reactions 
to events. Consider how the European policy on 
Iran’s nuclear capabilities developed in the wake 
of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. To avoid another 
war, the EU used sanctions—and the incentive of 
eventually lifting them—to back up initial dip-
lomatic efforts by France, Germany, and the UK 
to prevent the development of Iranian nuclear 
weapons. But expectations that the EU can unite 
to defend the liberal order could founder on 
member states’ incapacity to agree on a strategy 
to do so.
The principal basis for the EU’s power in inter-
national relations is the size of its single market. 
The combined gross domestic product of the 28 
member states is slightly larger than that of the 
United States or China, and these three big players 
have similar shares of world trade in goods. Be-
cause of the EU’s size and wealth, countries want to 
trade with it. In principle, this gives the EU lever-
age. Brexit will dimish that leverage. British gross 
domestic product accounts for approximately 19 
percent of EU GDP. Although the EU without the 
UK will still be one of the top three largest markets 
in the world, it will be almost a fifth smaller than 
it had been before Brexit.
The more worrying trend is that trade policy 
no longer enjoys a “permissive consensus” with-
in the EU, whereby ordinary Europeans allowed 
Brussels-based technocrats to make policy without 
much public input. Trade policy is one area where 
the EU has substantial supranational powers, but 
it has become more difficult as anti-globalization 
forces contest free trade. In 2016, the Canada-EU 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
was almost blocked by the veto of one Belgian re-
gion, and the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement 
was rejected by the Dutch in a referendum. The 
pending Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership has likewise been heavily criticized within 
the EU and the United States. Expanding and deep-
ening the EU’s web of agreements may prove too 
time-consuming and politically difficult in the near 
term, which clearly limits its potential influence. 
(The lessons for Britain, seeking a new trade agree-
ment with the EU, should be even more sobering.) 
Market power has been the foundation of EU inter-
national influence, but it may be too unwieldy to 
use efficiently and effectively.
After trade, the most important means of EU 
influence stems from its capacity to enlarge its 
membership. By making membership dependent 
on meeting a series of conditions, the EU has been 
able to foster reforms in prospective member 
states. But its enlargement policy is one clear casu-
alty of the various crises that the EU has faced. In-
deed, there seems to be little or no enthusiasm for 
further expansion to include those countries that 
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are already negotiating with the EU—Montene-
gro, Serbia, and Turkey—matching the apparently 
low desire, particularly in Turkey, to comply with 
membership conditions. The accession prospects 
for other hopeful candidates in southeastern Eu-
rope—Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedo-
nia, and Kosovo—have dimmed even further.
Beyond those candidates, it is clear that there 
will be no enlargement in even the medium to 
long term. The Netherlands’ ratification of the EU-
Ukraine association pact will proceed only because 
the European Council agreed in December 2016 
that the EU would not confer membership candi-
date status on Ukraine. The dilemma for the EU 
is that its now-unpopular enlargement policy has 
been the most effective instrument for expanding 
its influence in Europe. In the zero-sum game that 
Russia appears to be playing in the neighborhood, 
a failure to further enlarge the EU augments Rus-
sia’s influence and leaves countries outside the EU 
in an insecure grey zone.
BREXIT’S IMPACT
Brexit also negatively affects 
the EU’s other foreign-policy in-
struments. It will substantially 
diminish the size of the EU’s aid 
budget: Britain currently con-
tributes almost 15 percent of 
all EU funding for developing 
countries. The EU’s External Action Service will 
lose British experts, and since EU diplomacy also 
depends on the diplomatic capacities of its mem-
ber states, the UK’s loss will undoubtedly be felt in 
that arena as well. Although Britain was not in the 
forefront of recent EU diplomatic efforts to medi-
ate the Ukraine-Russia conflict or to manage rela-
tions with Turkey regarding the refugee crisis, it 
has been a key player in the past, including during 
negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue.
Britain has not been a major contributor of 
troops to EU military missions, and has ranked 
among the most reluctant member states when it 
comes to boosting EU defense cooperation. But a 
loss of British capabilities will nonetheless be felt 
because the UK has provided crucial resources to 
some missions, such as providing the operational 
headquarters for the EU’s anti-piracy mission off 
the coast of Somalia. It could, however, be rela-
tively easy to enable Britain to participate in fu-
ture EU missions abroad, since there are already 
mechanisms allowing “third countries,” including 
Norway and the United States, to do so.
Finally, Brexit will diminish the EU’s soft pow-
er (its power of attraction), which was already 
undermined as the EU stumbled through crisis 
after crisis without appearing to resolve any of 
them satisfactorily. And now one of its key mem-
ber states wants to leave. The EU’s global image 
has undoubtedly suffered, reducing its ability to 
convince other states to support its preferences 
without having to resort to its other sources of 
power.
Along with the growing appeal of anti-EU pop-
ulism in several other member countries, Brexit 
will reduce EU capabilities and make it consider-
ably more difficult to meet expectations that Eu-
rope will take decisive action to defend the liberal 
world order. There are ways in which the impact 
of Brexit could be minimized by focusing re-
sources on a more limited set of goals while step-
ping back from others. For example, the EU, usu-
ally through the high representative for foreign 
affairs and security policy, issues a large number 
of declarations every month with no clear pur-
pose; the resources devoted to 
preparing them could be better 
expended on other tasks. But 
even with such adjustments, 
the capabilities-expectations 
gap would still be worrisome.
HOLLOW RHETORIC
A further challenge is the rhetoric-practice gap 
in EU foreign policy, which calls into question the 
EU’s credibility as a bastion of the liberal world or-
der. Values such as respect for human rights and 
democracy are frequently highlighted as the heart 
of EU foreign policy. Catherine Ashton, the former 
high representative, often said that “human rights 
run as a silver thread through EU external poli-
cies.” In practice, however, that thread has some-
times been hard to detect.
The nub of the problem is that member states 
have much to disagree about with respect to pro-
moting values. There are divisions over the rela-
tive importance of values when core security and 
economic interests are perceived to compete with 
them. The persistent lack of European support for 
democracy in North African and Middle Eastern 
countries can be attributed to fear that liberalizing 
their political systems would open the door to rad-
ical Islamist governments. There are also intra-EU 
divisions over how best to promote values: some 
member states prefer a strategy of engagement, 
while others favor sanctions. These divisions lead 
The EU is prepared to drive  
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to variable, not to say inconsistent, policies—and 
thus leave the EU vulnerable to accusations that 
it has double standards, despite all the rhetoric to 
the contrary. This weakens the potential for EU 
leadership. Authoritarian regimes have become 
very adept at using Western hypocrisy to justify 
their own actions.
The rhetoric-practice gap is also wide when it 
comes to EU proclamations about its “partner-
ships” around the world. Even countries the EU 
labels “strategic partners,” with which it can co-
operate in the pursuit of given goals, are some-
times treated as pupils to be educated as the EU 
sees fit. The myriad strategies and action plans 
that are intended to guide EU foreign policy tend 
to include long lists of things that other countries 
are supposed to do to meet EU expectations of 
reform or transformation. This may be reason-
able, and some countries may in fact want EU 
help to enact reform. But with the rise of alterna-
tive powers, this model of interaction risks losing 
effectiveness: why put up with 
hectoring from the EU if you 
can choose other friends or al-
lies?
The capabilities-expectations 
gap points to the challenges the 
EU will face in using its resourc-
es to try to reach its goals—if it 
can, in fact, agree on common 
objectives. The rhetoric-practice gap illustrates 
how EU collective action could nonetheless back-
fire. Yet the picture that emerges over the next 
couple of years may not be as bleak as this analysis 
suggests. 
DEFENDING ITS INTERESTS
As the gap between rhetoric and practice dem-
onstrates, the EU has never fully lived up to the 
image of a normative power held dear by some 
commentators and EU insiders. Its record is a mix 
of self-interested and liberal multilateralist poli-
cies. The EU may be one of the world’s most com-
mitted supporters of the United Nations, promot-
ers of human rights and democracy, and upholders 
of the rule of law, but it can also act decisively to 
defend the shared security and economic interests 
of its member states. So even in a world in which 
there is considerable contestation of liberal norms 
and institutions, the EU can stand its ground—be-
cause its policies are intended to protect Europe-
an interests, not the liberal world order as such, 
though sometimes the two can overlap.
The EU has in the past defended its interests ro-
bustly when they have been threatened. EU mem-
ber states united to oppose the Reagan adminis-
tration’s extraterritorial sanctions on European 
companies working on a Soviet gas pipeline in the 
early 1980s, for example. More recently, the EU has 
managed to maintain unity in implementing sanc-
tions on Russia over its intervention in Ukraine, 
despite the fact that attitudes toward Russia vary 
widely across the union. Russia’s breach of core 
norms on respect for sovereignty and the accept-
able use of force has so far been enough to pre-
serve unity. The EU is likely to remain commit-
ted to the Iranian nuclear agreement even if the 
Trump administration renounces it, not only be-
cause the EU spent so much time and effort trying 
to forge it, but also because commercial and se-
curity interests align in support of the agreement. 
For many years, the EU pressed ahead on climate-
change policy largely on its own, and it is unlikely 
to cease its support for international efforts to lim-
it global warming now. Indeed, 
with Trump threatening to pull 
the United States out of the Paris 
climate agreement, an EU-China 
partnership on climate change 
could emerge.
Furthermore, the EU is not 
above practicing a bit of trans-
actional foreign policy itself. 
It can be an extremely hard negotiator especially 
on trade issues, tenaciously defending European 
economic interests, as numerous countries (such 
as South Africa in the 1990s, when it was in the 
midst of its transition to a multiracial democracy) 
have discovered. And it should be recognized that 
to many on the receiving end of the “liberal world 
order,” it may not look appealing at all. Global free 
trade does create winners and losers, and EU trade 
policy has been geared toward maximizing the 
gains for the EU, not necessarily minimizing the 
losses for trading partners, even developing coun-
tries. Opposition to the EU’s economic partnership 
agreements with African countries centers on the 
damage that their terms can do to development, 
as domestic producers struggle to compete against 
higher levels of imports from the EU.
The EU holds strong cards and has been pre-
pared to play them when doing so suits its inter-
ests. Defending the European project in the face 
of Brexit is one such occasion, and all indications 
are that the EU is prepared to drive quite a hard 
bargain with Britain.
Can the European Union  
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in an increasingly  
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SILVER LININGS?
Another reason for some optimism about the 
role the EU can play in an illiberal world is that 
external challenges could prompt the member 
states to band closer together. Above all, a more 
mercurial United States, less consistent in its sup-
port for European integration, could force the EU 
to rely more on itself. In the past, US resistance 
to stronger European defense cooperation part-
ly explained the EU’s faltering progress toward a 
common security and defense policy. Although 
the US stance later changed to conditional sup-
port, American demands that Europe defend itself 
could push the EU member states closer together. 
Strengthening the common defense policy is 
now a key focus of the high representative for for-
eign affairs and security policy, Federica Mogh-
erini, as she signaled in the 2016 EU Global Strat-
egy. Much work has been done on this front in 
recent months, including measures to strengthen 
EU cooperation with NATO. Of course, the extent 
to which European capabilities would need to be 
pooled and shared in order to achieve even a mini-
mally effective common defense policy is daunt-
ing, and EU member states are still divided over 
numerous issues regarding the use of force. But a 
less dependable United States may end up func-
tioning as an “external federator.”
To be sure, the reasons for optimism mostly 
point to the probability that the EU will be able to 
defend its own interests in an increasingly hos-
tile environment, whether or not those interests 
coincide with key tenets of a multilateral liberal 
order. But a more illiberal external environment 
could act as a useful reminder to the EU that 
many of the differences member states may have 
over values are minor when compared with the 
differences they have with other international 
powers. This could lead them to focus on fun-
damentals—a set of core human rights, norms, 
and so on—and defend those against illiberal 
contestation. In so doing, the EU could reach out 
to moderates in many other regions—perhaps to 
establish a coalition in favor of the International 
Criminal Court, or against torture. EU member 
states have already been actively engaging in di-
plomacy within cross-regional groups in UN hu-
man rights forums, so there is a basis on which 
to build wide alliances in favor of fundamental 
norms. If this were to happen—and it is a big if—
the EU could lead the liberal pushback, as long as 
internal clashes over values do not worsen, with 
Poland and Hungary taking an ever more illiberal 
path.
There are some grounds for believing that the 
EU will not be torn asunder by circling wolves. 
But the challenges are daunting, the capabilities-
expectations and rhetoric-practice gaps are large, 
and the reasons for optimism are highly contin-
gent on member states actively seeking unity, 
somewhat in contrast to their past behavior. As for 
the nation preparing to leave the EU, it is faced 
with difficult choices of its own. Will the UK try 
to stymie closer defense or foreign-policy coopera-
tion in Europe? Will it turn its back on the EU and 
instead seek alliances with the Trump administra-
tion—which necessarily would be a transactional 
relationship—or other powers? Or will it end up 
as a close associate of the EU, with interests, val-
ues, and policies in alignment? The direction of 
British foreign policy is not yet clear, but at some 
point very soon, these questions will have to be 
addressed in London. A Britain that acts closely 
with Europe is obviously in the best interests of 
the EU; a Britain that does not would be yet an-
other obstacle to EU leadership. !
